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Despite general economic decline and power-supply 
deficiencies, infrastructure made a modest net 
contribution of just less than half a percentage point to 
Zimbabwe’s improved per capita growth performance 
in recent years. Raising the country’s infrastructure 
endowment to that of the region’s middle-income 
countries could boost annual growth by about 2.4 
percentage points.
   Zimbabwe made significant progress in infrastructure 
in its early period as an independent state, building 
a national electricity network with regional 
interconnections, an extensive and internationally 
connected road network, and a water and sewer system. 
But the country has been unable to maintain its existing 
infrastructure since it became immersed in economic and 
political turmoil in the late 1990s. Zimbabwe now faces 
a number of important infrastructure challenges, the 
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at cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.  
most pressing of which lie in the power and water sectors, 
where deteriorating conditions pose risks to the economy 
and public health.
   Zimbabwe currently spends about $0.8 billion per year 
on infrastructure, though $0.7 billion of this is lost to 
inefficiencies of various kinds. Even if these inefficiencies 
were fully captured, Zimbabwe would still face an 
infrastructure funding gap of $0.6 billion per year. That 
staggering figure can be reduced, however, to $0.4 billion 
if the country adopts a more modest spending scenario, 
or even to $0.1 billion under a minimalist, maintenance-
only scenario. To close the gap, Zimbabwe needs to 
raise additional public, private-sector, and international 
funding, which, when coupled with the prospect of 
economic rebound and prudent policies, would allow the 
country to regain its historic infrastructure advantages. 
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Despite general economic decline and power supply deficiencies, infrastructure made a modest net 
contribution of less than half a percentage point to Zimbabwe‘s improved per capita growth performance 
in recent years. Raising the country‘s infrastructure endowment to that of the region‘s middle-income 
countries could boost annual growth by about 2.4 percentage points. 
Zimbabwe made significant progress in infrastructure in its early period as an independent state. The 
country managed to put in place a national electricity network and establish regional interconnection in 
the power sector; to build an extensive network of roads for countrywide accessibility and integration into 
the regional transport corridors; to lay the water and sewerage system; and to make progress on building 
dams and tapping the significant irrigation potential. Unfortunately, at present the cross-cutting issue 
across all these sectors is Zimbabwe‘s inability to maintain and rehabilitate the existing infrastructure 
since the country became immersed in economic and political turmoil in the late 1990s. Neglect of all 
sectors due to the crisis has resulted in a generalized lack of new investment (in the power and water 
sectors in particular), and the accumulation of a huge rehabilitation agenda. Quality of service has 
declined across the board. The power system has become unjustifiably costly, inefficient, and unreliable. 
The condition of roads has deteriorated to the point that Zimbabwe became a bottleneck on the North–
South transport corridor. Rural connectivity hardly exists. Failure to treat potable water, along with the 
deterioration of the water, sanitation, and garbage disposal systems, was responsible for the spread of 
cholera in 2008. By 2010 cholera affected most areas of the country and posed a health threat to 
neighboring countries. 
Looking ahead, Zimbabwe faces a number of important infrastructure challenges. Zimbabwe‘s most 
pressing challenges lie in the power and water sectors. Inefficient and unreliable power supply poses 
major risks to the economy, while the maintenance and upgrading of existing power infrastructure no 
longer looks to be affordable. At the same time, overhauling the water and sewerage system is imperative 
for curbing the public health crisis.  
With respect to regional integration, Zimbabwe must improve the condition of the international road 
corridors that pass through its territory, along with reducing transit costs and transit time, to gain the most 
from its strategic location in the heart of the southern Africa region and its proximity to the region‘s 
largest economy and trading partner: South Africa. 
Addressing Zimbabwe‘s infrastructure challenges will require sustained expenditure of almost 
$2 billion per year over the next decade, with heavy emphasis on rehabilitation; more than half is needed 
for the power sector. This overall level of spending would represent 46 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP),
1 one of the largest infrastructure burdens for any African country. Investment alone would absorb 
31 percent of GDP, roughly twice the unprecedented infrastructure investment effort made by China 
during the 2000s. Even if measured in terms of average precrisis GDP, the overall infrastructure spending 
needs would absorb some 30 percent of GDP. 
                                                 





Given the magnitude of the burden, some less ambitious infrastructure spending scenarios were also 
considered. An intermediate scenario considers a somewhat less ambitious set of infrastructure targets and 
greater reliance on lower-cost technologies and brings the overall spending needs down to $1.7 billion 
annually, which would still represent about 39 percent of the 2009 GDP. A minimalist scenario considers 
only rehabilitation and maintenance expenditure for existing assets with no new investment. This would 
bring costs down to $1.2 billion annually, still absorbing 28 percent of the 2009 GDP. These scenarios 
illustrate that the bulk of the spending needs have to do with addressing the neglect of recent years, and 
that even this apparently modest objective hardly looks affordable when viewed against the contraction of 
GDP that has taken place over the intervening period. As of today, the country seems to find itself in the 
difficult position of having more infrastructure assets than it can afford to sustain. 
Zimbabwe already spends around $0.8 billion per year on infrastructure between government budget, 
parastatal companies, donor spending, and foreign direct investment (FDI). This is already equivalent to 
about 18 percent of the 2010 GDP and indicates that the country strives to improve the state of its 
infrastructure. This spending takes place against a broader macroeconomic backdrop of sharply declining 
gross domestic investment, which fell from 19 percent of GDP in 2000 to 3 percent in 2006. 
What is particularly striking is that $0.7 billion a year is being lost to inefficiencies of various kinds, 
which is almost as much as total current spending and amounts to almost 16 percent of GDP. The main 
sources of inefficiency are underpricing in the power, water, and roads sectors and poor financial 
management of utilities. If Zimbabwe could raise tariffs to cost-recovery levels and align operational 
inefficiencies with reasonable developing country benchmarks, these measures alone would almost 
double the existing flow of resources to the infrastructure sectors. 
Assuming that the inefficiencies could be fully captured, an annual funding gap of $0.6 billion per 
year would remain for the full set of infrastructure spending needs. The funding gap would drop to $0.4 
billion per year for the intermediate investment scenario, and further fall to $0.1 billion under a 
minimalist spending scenario. By far the largest gaps exist in the power and water sectors. Zimbabwe has 
the potential to close this gap by raising additional public funding for infrastructure from increased fiscal 
receipts of various kinds, particularly when the international sanctions are lifted. Furthermore, Zimbabwe 
has not captured as much private financing for infrastructure — as a percentage of GDP — as many of its 
neighbors have succeeded in capturing so far. This scope for improvement, coupled with the prospect of 
economic rebound and prudent policies, should help the country to regain its historic advantages in 
infrastructure. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Zimbabwe. The results have been 
presented in reports covering different areas of infrastructure—information and communication 
technology (ICT), irrigation, power, transport, water and sanitation—as well as various policy areas, 





This report presents the key AICD findings for Zimbabwe, allowing the country‘s infrastructure 
situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Given that Zimbabwe is at present a 
distressed low-income country, but has approached middle-income status in the past, two sets of African 
benchmarks will be used to evaluate Zimbabwe‘s situation: that of low-income countries and that of 
middle-income countries. Detailed comparisons will also be made with Zimbabwe‘s immediate regional 
neighbors in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. In the particular case of Zimbabwe, it is hardly possible to make 
sense of the financial data for the period 2005–08 due to the spiraling currency crisis: hyperinflation 
soared to an official figure of over 230 million percentlow-income countrieby February 2008. Therefore 
the report will focus on the Zimbabwe‘s 2004 pre-currency-crisis and 2009 post-currency-crisis data 
points. Most technical data presented are for 2006 (or the most recent year available), while financial data 
for comparator countries are typically averaged over 2001–06 to smooth out the effect of short-term 
fluctuations.  
Second, to make comparisons across countries, indicators are standardized to allow for a consistent 
cross-country analysis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different 
from those that are routinely reported and discussed at the country level. 
Why infrastructure matters 
In common with the rest of the continent, southern Africa‘s
2 growth performance improved markedly in 
the 2000s vis-à-vis the 1990s. The overall improvement in per capita growth rates has been estimated at 
2.1 percentage points, of which 1.1 points are attributable to better structural policies and 1.0 point to 
improved infrastructure. Zimbabwe stands out markedly as a sad exception. Zimbabwe‘s broad-based 
output declined dramatically during 2000–08. Its GDP contracted by roughly 50 percent —possibly the 
largest peacetime contraction ever recorded
3—reaching a low point in 2008. The recent introduction of 
effective policy measures, including the dollarization of the economy, is likely to lead to a nascent 
economic rebound (figure 1). 
                                                 
2 Southern Africa (or those countries in the SADC) includes Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, 
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 





Figure 1. Zimbabwe’s economy is set for recovery 
 
Despite the overall decline, improvements in infrastructure did add around 0.3 percentage points to 
the per capita growth rate for 2003–07 (figure 2a), offsetting some of the overall GDP decline. In the 
context of Zimbabwe‘s deteriorating economic environment, this overall impact was much less 
pronounced than in other neighboring southern African countries such as South Africa, Angola, Zambia, 
and Malawi, where infrastructure contributed twice as much to the per capita growth rate as it did in 
Zimbabwe. As in these neighboring countries, Zimbabwe‘s boost came predominately from the ICT 
revolution, while power sector deficiencies held growth back by around 0.07 percentage points. 
Figure 2. Infrastructure’s contribution to growth comparatively low, with power holding back the economy, but 
considerable potential present 
a. Infrastructure’s contribution to annual per capita economic growth in selected countries, 2003–07, in percentage points 
 


































































































b. Potential contributions of infrastructure to annual per capita economic growth in selected countries, in percentage points 
 
Source: Calderón 2009. 
Looking ahead, simulations suggest that if Zimbabwe‘s infrastructure could be improved to the level 
of the African leader—Mauritius—annual per capita growth rates would be 2.4 percentage points higher 
than they are at present. This impact would come from improvements not only in ICT, but also from an 
increase in power-generating capacity and better road infrastructure (figure 2b). 
The state of Zimbabwe’s infrastructure 
Zimbabwe‘s population of around 11.3 million is relatively evenly distributed across the country, though 
more densely populated urban areas surround the capital Harare and other major cities, and there are more 
scarcely populated areas in the western and southern parts of the country (figure 3a). Geographically, 
Zimbabwe is located on a plateau that forms a watershed between the Zambezi and Limpopo river 
systems. Consequently, it has significant agriculture, forestry, and tourism potential. But agriculture, 
which used to be the backbone of the economy, has declined as a result of the near collapse of 
commercial farming during the past decade, and has been further aggravated by apparent neglect of rural 
roads in high-value agricultural areas. 
Zimbabwe is endowed with more than 40 minerals
4—including gold, diamonds, ferrochrome, copper, 
and coal—clustered along the mining belt running across the country from north to south (figure 3c). 
Gold used to be the country‘s key foreign currency source, but its production has declined in recent years. 
By African standards, Zimbabwe has impressive backbone infrastructure, including power, roads, 
ICT, and water. The country is historically well integrated with its neighbors when it comes to power and 
transport networks, allowing Zimbabwe to participate in regional trade and act as a critical transit country 
for landlocked neighbors Zambia and Botswana and a key link in the north-south surface corridors 
(figures 3d–h). But the deteriorating quality of this infrastructure is currently jeopardizing the 
functionality of the regional and national links. 




























































































































This report begins by reviewing the main achievements and challenges in each of Zimbabwe‘s major 
infrastructure sectors, with the key findings summarized below (table 1). Thereafter, attention will turn to 
the problem of how to finance Zimbabwe‘s outstanding infrastructure needs. 
Table 1. Achievements and challenges in Zimbabwe’s infrastructure sectors 
  Achievements  Challenges 
Air transport  Growth in air-transport capacity due to tourism. 
Relatively safe service. 




High fixed telephone line penetration. Mobile telephony 
market more than doubled in 2009. 
Competitive fixed telephone line and mobile retail pricing. 
Substantial private investment. 
Boosting competition sector wide to reduce costs. 
Increasing international connectivity. 
Irrigation  Relatively developed irrigation sector, though still small in 
absolute terms. 
Capturing significant unexploited potential particularly for 
large-scale irrigation schemes. 
Power  National grid with regional interconnections. 
Comparatively high installed capacity and access. 
Financing huge investment and rehabilitation needs. 
Strengthening sector finances by raising tariffs and enforcing 
revenue collection. 
Railways  Functional railway network with regional interconnections 
and relatively high traffic density. 
Removing tariff distortions that prevent railways from 
functioning effectively as part of the regional corridor. 
Roads  Relatively dense national road network with good regional 
interconnections. 
Modern road sector institutions established. 
Securing adequate financing to support much-needed road 
maintenance and rehabilitation. 
Addressing serious border delays that prevent effective 
functioning of regional road corridor. 
Improving rural accessibility for productive agricultural land. 
Water 
resources 
Relatively well endowed with water storage.  Providing improved water security for agriculture. 
Water and 
sanitation 
Relatively high coverage of piped water and flush toilets.  Improving performance of utilities and rehabilitating decrepit 
infrastructure with a view to restoring water quality. 
Reversing decline in access to sanitation. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on findings of this report. 





Figure 3. Zimbabwe’s infrastructure aligns with the geographical distribution of its mineral resources and population 
a. Population 
 











c. Natural resources 
 













e. Type and condition of roads 
 





f. Road and rail traffic 
 














Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Zimbabwelow-income countrie). 
Power 
Achievements 
Zimbabwe‘s installed capacity and access to electricity compare favorably to countries of similar income 
in Africa. Total installed capacity at 1,960 megawatts (MW) and per capita capacity at 146 MW are three 
and seven times higher, respectively, than what the nation‘s African low-income peers have in place. 
Zimbabwe‘s overall access rates and rural access rates are also better than the average for African low-
income countries (table 2). Estimates from 2009 indicate that these access levels had improved to 
40 percent of Zimbabwe‘s population from 30 percent in the early 2000s. Almost 80 percent of the urban 
population had access to electricity and almost 20 percent of the rural population had access to electricity. 
Most of this performance is the result of systematic investment carried out in and around the late 1980s, 
when Zimbabwe established a relatively good power infrastructure backbone with decent installed 
capacity and a recognizable national grid, and attained good access levels. Thus, unlike many other parts 





Table 2. Benchmarking Zimbabwe’s power infrastructure 









Access to electricity (national)  % of population  33.9  41.5  33  50 
Access to electricity (urban)  % of population    79  86  73 
Access to electricity (rural)  % of population    19  12.7  26.3 
Installed capacity per million 
population 
MW per million 
population  151  146  20  799 
Power outages  days/year  14.6    10.4  5.9 
Collection rate  % billing  49  62  92  91 
Revenue per unit  U.S. cents/ kWh  1  5  14  13 
System losses  % of generation  13  11  24  20 
Cost recovery  % total cost  19  65  89  85 
Hidden costs  % of revenue  560  108     





  residential at 100 kWh  U.S. cents  2  6  14.5 
5.0–10.0    commercial at 100 kWh  U.S. cents    7  18.8 
  industrial at 50,000 kWh  U.S. cents    7  14.2 
Source: All sources are AICD unless indicated otherwise. Access to electricity (national, urban and rural) from World Energy Outlook 
(International Energy Association, 2010); installed power capacity data for 2009 based on presentation from Zimbabwe investor conference 
(2009); collection rate data based on World Bank staff information based on 2004 and 2009; revenue per unit derived from data based on AICD 
calculations for 2004 and 2009; system losses are for 2003 and 2009 and are based on World Bank (2008a) and World Bank staff estimates; 
cost recovery calculated based on World Bank (2010) and are for 2004 and 2009; hidden costs based on data from 2004 and 2009 and derived 
from AICD calculations; and tariff information is for 2004 and 2009 and derived based on World Bank (2010). 
Note: MW = megawatts; kWh = kilowatt-hour. 
Challenges 
Zimbabwe‘s power infrastructure is starved of new investments, however. Zimbabwe has not seen any 
investments to expand its generation infrastructure since 1988, when Hwange Power Station added 440 
MW. Only around 60 percent of the 1,960 MW of installed capacity is operational. Installed capacity in 
per capita terms is following a clear downward trend (table 2). Power transmission and distribution 
networks have been further corroded due to damage and theft. This vandalism produced losses of about 
$400,000 a month during 2009, of which only 40 percent was recovered later (World Bank 2010). 
ZESA,Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority,the integrated power utility, faces an unsustainable 
financial situation that leaves no room for new investments. Sixty-eight percent of Zimbabwe‘s installed 
capacity is thermal as of 2008, and ZESA uses 2.4 million tonnes of coal per year for thermal power 
generation. Between over half of its coal comes from the state-owned Hwange Colliery Company, which 
has continuously subsidized the coal ZESA buys. Other inputs such as water (for hydropower generation) 
and transportation services are also provided at below-market costs (World Bank 2008b). Yet, despite the 
highly subsidized prices, ZESA was unable to pay Hwange for its coal supply. The inability of ZESA to 





But Hwange is working at only 35 percent capacity, leaving Zimbabwe increasingly dependent on its 
neighbors for coal and electricity imports to satisfy power demand—the nation imports 20–35 percent of 
its power from South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, and Zambia. A recent 
study found that ZESA would need 11,000 tonnes of coal per month if the thermal plants were to run at 
full capacity. At present, ZESA consumes only 6,000 tonnes of coal per month. The price of domestic 
coal is about half the international coal price, in part because of its lower quality (World Bank 2010), but 
primarily due to the subsidy applied. ZESA finds itself in a bind, since it is expensive to replace domestic 
coal with imported coal. 
But the supply of imported electricity is in jeopardy as ZESA‘s weak financial position has resulted in 
nonpayment for power imports from neighboring countries. Power imports declined in the late 2000s by 
as much as 44 percent due to ZESA‘s inability to make timely payments. The amount payable totaled 
$41.8 million, of which $23.8 million (57 percent) was at least 90 days delinquent (World Bank 2009b). 
Imports from Zambia, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were cut off due to these 
payment problems. ESKOM—South Africa‘s power utility—converted the debt into a loan for Zimbabwe 
(Kaseke 2009). ZESA‘s inability to repay the loans required government support, and by February 2009, 
the government-guaranteed external debt owed by ZESA was almost $400 million, all of which has 
become due and payable.
5 
Recent efforts to level tariffs with costs have not been enough to allow ZESA to reach cost-recovery 
status. The average true cost of power is about $0.10 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in Zimbabwe, which is 
already relatively low by African standards (figure 4). Nonetheless, due to subsidies of various kinds, at 
present tariffs amount to only $0.06 per kWh, among the lowest in Africa. 
Figure 4. Moderate tariffs for power in Zimbabwe do not recover costs 
a. Power prices 
 
                                                 
5 The analysis covers the ZPC and ZETDC [[expand acronyms?]]operations, including management fees which they pay to the 


























































































































































































































































b. Power costs 
 
Source: Power price: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2010; Zimbabwe average tariff derived based on World Bank (2010); power costs: 
Eberhard and others 2008 
Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
ZESA also faces difficulties with revenue collection, which deprives the utility of millions of dollars 
each year. Only 60 percent of ZESA‘s bills are collected, a very poor performance when compared to 
other low-income countries in Africa (table 2), but nonetheless a slight improvement from the collection 
rate in the early 2000s, when less than 50 percent of the bills were collected. At present, around 83 
percent of the arrears are from the private sector, though nonpayment from other parastastals and the 
government is a significant issue and creates a perverse tax on utilities. 
Fortunately in Zimbabwe network losses are a relatively minor concern as the backbone transmission 
and distribution network, despite the lack of investment, remains in good condition. Another interesting 
element is the low system losses, which are in part due to low levels of nontechnical losses. A valid 
explanation for these small losses could be that the cheap power prices deter power theft. 
In 2009 the cumulative effect of these inefficiencies amounted to $485 million, or the equivalent of 
100 percent of ZESA‘s revenues (table 3). Over 50 percent of the costs are due to collection inefficiencies 
while essentially the rest is traceable to tariff subsidies (table 3). 
ZESA‘s hidden costs remain high in absolute terms, but they have been coming down in recent years. 
In 2009 tariffs were increased about $0.01 to current levels of $0.065 per kWh, which led to a substantial 
reduction in hidden costs. The circumstantial reduction in the volume of power sold also helped to contain 
hidden costs, though it does not represent any kind of improvement in efficiency. Yet, compared to other 
southern African countries, hidden costs in 2009 are still high at around 400 percent of sector revenues, 
second only to those found in the Democratic Republic of Congo (figure 5). 
While not included in the estimates of hidden costs in figure 5, labor-related inefficiencies further 
curtailed ZESA‘s financial security, draining as much as 16 percent from revenues in 2009. As of 2007, 
ZESA employed around 6,455 staff and was plagued by low staff utilization that reduced the scale of 
operations. The number of workers per gigawatt-hour of power produced was 0.86, four times larger than 
the figure for several other countries. 



































































































































































































































Table 3. Massive inefficiencies are related mainly to underpricing and undercollection of bills  








Total hidden costs 
   (GWh/year)  (%)  (%)  ($/kWh)  ($/kWh)  ($ millions/year) 
2001  10,152  16.2  49  0.10  0.05  855 
2002  11,327  13.6  49  0.10  0.07  771 
2003  10,411  13.1  49  0.10  0.02  953 
2004  10,405  11.5  49  0.10  0.01  964 
2005  10,755  10.8  62  0.10  0.05  772 
2006  10,451  10.5  62  0.10  0.06  643 
2007  9,239  11.0  65  0.10  0.01  874 
2008  8,756  11.0  62  0.10  0.01  560 
2009  8,912  11.0  62  0.10  0.065  485 
Source: Calculations based on the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) annual reports 2005–09, World Bank 2011, World Bank 2009b , World 
Bank 2008alow-income countrieand World Bank staff estimates. 
Note: The cost-recovery benchmark in Zimbabwe takes into account the unit cost of power generation within Zimbabwe, the cost of buying 
power from neighboring country utilities at $0.02–$0.03 per kilowatt, and the cost of transmission and distribution of power. 
GWh = gigawatt-hour; kWh = kilowatt-hour. 
Figure 5. Benchmarking Zimbabwe’s hidden costs against southern African peers, 2008–09  
 
Source: AICD calculations. 
Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
The reliability of Zimbabwe‘s power supply is much worse than that of its peers, with serious effects 
on the productivity of businesses. Zimbabwe has faced greater power outages than what low- or middle- 
income countries in Africa typically encounter. Households with electricity connections lack power for 15 
days a year due to power outages (table 2). Erratic power supply has resulted in loss of productivity 
across various sectors. For example, a sample of 50 wheat-producing farmers indicated that problems of 
load shedding resulted in low agricultural yields. Load shedding ranged on average from 8 to 12 hours a 
day, halving expected yields (from 6 to 8 metric tonnes to 3 tonnes per hectare). Around 70 percent of 
farmers indicated that frequent load shedding damaged their farm equipment. The economic loss due to 














erratic power supply for the surveyed farmers was approximately $2 million (Kaseke 2009). Another 
study found that inadequate electricity impeded the efficiency of the mining sector (box 1). 
Box 1. Costs of inadequate electricity to the mining sector in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is richly endowed with over 40 different minerals that have a high demand in international markets, 
and mining activities in Zimbabwe contribute around 13 percent to gross domestic product (GDP) and are the 
second-greatest contributors to foreign-currency earnings after agriculture. The minerals extracted include gold, 
coal, nickel, platinum, and diamonds. Extraction of these minerals in Zimbabwe has been plagued by persistent 
power cuts, which has been cited as the main obstacle to the productivity of Zimbabwe‘s mining industry. 
Almost 90 percent of the mines surveyed indicated that electricity was a major obstacle to mining operations. 
Firms indicated that frequent outages that were as much as over 12 hours plagued efficiency of mineral 
extraction.  
Erratic power supply at mines resulted in loss of output, idle labor costs, and costs associated with restarting the 
mining operations when the power returned. Disaggregating the costs of irregular power supply indicates that 
85 percent of the costs were due to loss in output. Mining companies had to spend large amounts on backup 
generation as well as stock up on additional fuel, oil, and grease required to run the backup equipment. Backup 
equipment was run on average 4 hours a day for at least five to six times per week. Smaller mines were far more 
impacted by unreliable power supply than the larger mines. The smaller mines were often unable to finance the 
large amounts of backup generation required and were unable to mitigate the costs of inadequate power. During 
power outages, a majority of the laborers were idle, waiting for the power to resume. This idle time led to 
significant costs for the mines as these laborers were paid even for their idle time. Overall, the outage cost per 
kilowatt-hour ranged from $1.20 to $13. In absolute terms, inadequate power supply led to massive loss in 
productivity for mining companies. 
Source: Kaseke 2010. 
Obtaining power connections in Zimbabwe is a lengthy and costly process. The situation during 1999 
to 2006 indicates that the rate of connection of new customers declined by 50 percent while the waiting 
list for connections increased fourfold. The waiting time for new connectionslow-income countriewas 
reported to have increased from less than a month in 2000–01 to between 9 and 16 months in 2005–06 
(World Bank 2008a), while 2010 estimates indicate that the wait time for firms is about 4 months (World 
Bank 2011). Moreover, the cost of making the connection once the opportunity arises is high; firms pay 
the equivalent of 650 times the country‘s per capita income to obtain such a connection, although this is 
not dissimilar to trends observed elsewhere in Africa (World Bank 2010). 
Looking ahead, Zimbabwe has a key role to play as a transit country in regional power trade with the 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The geographic proximity of Zimbabwe and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo—the country with southern Africa‘s greatest hydropower resources—makes 
Zimbabwe a key player in regional trade (figure 6).
6  
                                                 
6 Future power demand can either be met through expanding national production or expanding cross-border power trade within 
the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Two alternative scenarios will be considered in this report. The trade-stagnation 
scenario assumes that no additional cross-border interconnectors will be built, so that trade is constrained at the levels observed 
today, and countries are thus obliged to meet incremental power demands solely through the development of their own domestic 
power sectors. For many SAPP countries that lack significant energy resources of their own, this entails increased reliance on 
thermal generation fueled by oil imports. Alternatively, under the trade-expansion scenario, future regional power demand is met 
by the most cost-effective energy resources available to the region as a whole, and additional cross-border transmission capacity 
is added wherever required to allow power to flow from production to consumption locations. Essentially, this scenario takes 
regional power trade to its fullest economic potential, assuming that there are no restrictions to cross-border exchange and that 
the necessary infrastructure can be built wherever it is required. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between the trade-stagnation 





There is the potential for Zimbabwe to 
benefit significantly from wheeling Congolese 
power southwards toward markets in 
neighboring countries, notably South Africa. 
Assuming trade expansion, Zimbabwe could 
transmit up to 20 terawatt-hours (TWh) of 
power from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
to Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa. 
But to participate in trade, Zimbabwe would 
need to develop 3,100 MW of interconnector 
capacity, with a price tag of $370 million over 
the next 10 years. Wheeling of power at $1.40 per kilowatt to $28 per kilowatt
7 would allow Zimbabwe to 
benefit from a return of anywhere between 1 and 23 percent annually on its investment. 
Irrespective of the evolution of 
trade in southern Africa, 
Zimbabwe will always remain a 
modest net importer of power, 
continuing to rely primarily on its 
own coal-based and hydropower 
plants for generation. Future 
hydropower sites that could be 
developed include Batoka, Kariba 
Soth, and Mutapha Gorge (table 4). 
To meet domestic demand, 
Zimbabwe is expected to import no 
more than 4 TWh of power from 
its neighbors for domestic 
consumption going forward. 
To meet its own power 
demand and expand access to 70 
percent of the population, 
Zimbabwe will need to spend $1.2 
billion annually over a decade. Of 
this total, $375 million will be 
needed for new investment in 
generation, $97 million for 
rehabilitation of existing 
generation capacity, and $233 
million for generator maintenance. 
                                                 
7 These charges are used for illustrative purposes and drawn from The Potential of Regional Power Sector Integration: South 
African Power Pool (SAPP) Transmission and Trading Case Study (2009). 
Table 4. Zimbabwe’s possible hydropower expansion 
Project  Planned 
capacity 
(MW) 




300   3  200 
Mutapha Gorge*  300  7  454 
Batoka*  800  10  1,250 
Additional capacity  15  —  — 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo (2009). 
Note: * Borders Zambia (capacity and cost split between countries). 













Investment cost  375.5 
  Thermal  165.2 
  Hydro  201.2 
  Other  9.2 
Rehabilitation cost  97.4 
  Thermal  57.1 
  Hydro  40.4 
  Other  0.0 
Variable cost (fuel, O&M)  223.0 
  New capacity  106.1 































Investment cost  201 
  Cross-border  0 
  Distribution grid  75 
  Urban connection  20 
  Rural connection  106 
Rehabilitation cost  160 










  Capital cost  834 
Investment cost  577 
Rehabilitation cost  257 
Variable cost  408 
Total    1,242 
Source: Derived from Rosnes and Vennemo (2009). 
Note: O&M = operations and maintenance; T&D = transmission and distribution. 





Another $201 million of new investments is needed for transmission and distribution networks, $160 
million for network rehabilitation, and $185 million for network maintenance. Notably, more than half of 
required new investments into transmission and distribution are for rural electrification (table 5).  
Water resources  
Zimbabwe has a relatively limited endowment of water resources compared to countries occupying 
similar climatic zones. The major river systems are the Save, Runde, Mzingwane, Gwayi, Zanyati, 
Manyame, and Mazowe, all of which (except the Save and Runde) drain into either the Zambezi or the 
Limpopo. The renewable water resource per capita is estimated at about 1,547 cubic meters (m
3) per year 
(including the cross-border flows), well below the Sub-Saharan African average of 7,000 m
3. Rainfall 
averages 657 millimeters (mm) per year, but levels vary considerably across regions and during the 
course of the year. As of 2004 only 37 percent of the country received adequate rainfall for agriculture. 
For the remaining part of the country full-time irrigation systems are indispensable to balance out the 
erratic and unreliable rainfall patterns. 
There are several factors that put significant pressure on water resources. The need for agricultural 
production—representing 17 percent of Zimbabwe‘s GDP, 40 percent of total export earnings, and 79 
percent of the total water use—adds to the stress, in particular for wheat, cotton, and sugarcane 
productions. Residential demand—representing 14 percent of total water use—has increased over time, 
leaving water production in urban areas at 30 percent below requirements. The industrial sector—
accounting for 7 percent of total water use—is also growing. 
In the mid-1990s the government constructed a number of large and medium-sized dams to tackle 
increasing pressure on water resources, but the dams have been poorly maintained. As of 2004, total 
capacity was 103 cubic kilometers (km
3), including Lake Kariba on the Zambezi River, shared between 
Zambia and Zimbabwe and accounting for 94 km
3. Excluding the shared dam, the total capacity is about 9 
km
3 (figure 1a). But current utilization is only about 22 percent of mean annual runoff due to high-level 
siltation, poor drainage from irrigation schemes, leakage in urban areas, and loss of capacity of ground-
water recharge due to soil compaction. Absence of adequate dam maintenance also creates a high public-
safety risk from breaches and losses of large water volumes. 
Given the wide range of conflicting uses (agriculture, water supply, and industry), it is essential to 
have a clearly defined basis for allocating water rights among sectors so as to maximize their 
development impact. Beyond investments in dam maintenance, the development of large-scale irrigation 
projects would do much to alleviate rural poverty and enhance the resilience of rural livelihoods to 
constant droughts. 
Irrigation 
Irrigation in Zimbabwe falls well short of its potential. As of 2004 only 173,513 hectares were equipped 
for irrigation, plus a further 20,000 hectares that are water managed, yielding a total of 193,513 hectares. 
This is equivalent to 5.8 percentlow-income countrieof the country‘s cultivated area, well above the 
regional average of around 3.5 percent. Between 1973 and 2003 the irrigated area grew 3.6 percent 





estimated that around 60 percent of the labor force is involved in agriculture, a level comparable to the 
Sub-Saharan average. The agricultural value added per worker, $205, was below the Sub-Saharan average 
of $575 (figure 6).  
Figure 6. Zimbabwe’s irrigation sector 





Source: Map on current area: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Niger (www.infrastructureafrica.org). Map on irrigation potential: You 
2008.  
Note: Baseline scenario was calculated assuming investment cost of $3,000 per hectare, a canal-maintenance and water-delivery cost of $0.01 
per cubic meter, on-farm annual operation and maintenance costs of $30 per hectare, and a discount rate of 12 percent. IRR = internal rate of 
return. 





The country‘s current irrigated area could be increased substantially with good economic returns. 
Simulations suggest that with a threshold internal rate of return (IRR) of 6 percent, it would already be 
economically viable to develop a further 374,335 hectares of land for irrigation, of which 99 percent 
would be developed through large-scale projects. If the threshold of the IRR is raised to 12 percent the 
economically viable area for irrigation shrinks to 143,588 hectares, mainly for large-scale projects. The 
required investment for attaining this expansion is $286 million (table 6). This area is concentrated in the 
southeast and central parts of the country (figure 6b), which has the highest agricultural potential given 
the significant clay content of the soils. 
Table 6. Zimbabwe’s irrigation potential 
 
Large-scale  Small-scale  Total 
Investment  IRR  Area 
increase  Investment  IRR  Area 
increase  Investment  IRR  Area 
increase 
Cutoff (%)  $ million  %  ha  $ million  %  ha  $ million  %  ha 
0  1,132  8.2  579,876  40  3.0  7,692  1,171  8.1  587,568 
6  723  10.8  370,481  20  0.0  3,854  743  10.7  374,335 
12  277  14.7  141,846  9  0.0  1,742  286  14.6  143,588 
24  0  0.0  0  3  0.0  561  3  0.0  561 
Source: Derived from You and others (2009). 
Note: Water for irrigation can be collected in two ways: through large, dam-based schemes, or through small projects based on the collection of 
runoff from rainfall. The investment costs of large-scale irrigation development reflect only irrigation-specific infrastructure, such as distribution 
canals and on-farm system development. The potential for small-scale irrigation is assessed not only on the basis of agroecological conditions, 
but also in terms of market access, since irrigation is typically viable only if the increased yields can be readily marketed. The unit cost for 
large-scale projects is set at $3,000 per hectare and for small-scale projects at $2,000 per hectare. 
IRR = internal rate of return. 
 
Whereas Zimbabwe‘s irrigation potential for small-scale projects is one of the lowest among southern 
African countries (figure 7a), the nation stands as the country with the highest potential area increase for 
large-scale projects when the cutoff for the IRR is set at 12 percent (figure 7b). 
Water for irrigation can be collected in two ways: through large, dam-based schemes, or through 
small projects based on the collection of run-off from rainfall. The investment costs of large-scale 
irrigation development reflect only irrigation-specific infrastructure, such as distribution canals and on-
farm system development. The potential for small-scale irrigation is assessed not only on the basis of 
agroecological conditions, but also in terms of market access, since irrigation is typically viable only if 
the increased yields can be readily marketed. 





Figure 7. Irrigation potential 
a. Small scale  b. Large scale 
   
Source: Derived from You and others (2009). Based on 12 percent cutoff estimates, at which the estimated area increase for southern African 
countries not included in the figures is zero. 
Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements 
Zimbabwe‘s access to water-utility services is, nominally, among the highest in African low-income 
countries. Access to piped water is more than three times the rate found in other low-income countries, 
and Zimbabwe‘s reliance on surface water, at only 7 percent of the population, is correspondingly one of 
the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, below the average for middle-income countries and only one-fifth of 
comparable low-income countries (table 7).  




















































































































countries  Zimbabwe 
Middle-income 
countries 
Mid-2000s  1999  2005  Mid-2000s 
Access to piped water  % pop  9.3  34   37   61.1 
Access to standposts  % pop  17.1  10   5   22.1 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  39.3  49   50   4.8 
Access to surface water  % pop  34.2  6   7   10.9 
Access to flush toilets  % pop  4.7  33   36   47.7 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  18.3  25   14   33.7 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  38.5  16   20   6.9 
Open defecation  % pop  38.3  27   29   11.0 
        2006   
Domestic water consumption  liter/capita/day  50.9    202  196.4 
Continuity of supply  hours/day  18    20  24 
Revenue collection  % sales  94.1    —  99.3 
Distribution losses  % production  34.8    46  28.8 
Cost recovery  % total costs  89.5      86.3 
Operating cost recovery  % operating costs  125.2    —  120.8 
Labor costs  connections per employee  175.9    89  203.4 








    2005  2008  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s 
Residential tariff  US cents / m3  24  23  60  3–60 
Nonresidential tariff  US cents / m3  39  82  121 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys and AICD water and sanitation utilities database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data).  
Note: Access figures from the 1999 and 2005 Demographic and Health Surveys; — = Not available. 
Challenges 
Due to lack of proper maintenance, Zimbabwe‘s water and sanitation network is in dismal condition, 
constituting a threat to public health. The cholera outbreaks in 2008 and 2009 were a red flag to the poor 
state. The disease had killed more than 3,000 people and infected around 60,000 by February 6, 2009, 
according to the World Health Organization (WHO), and spread over most of the country and across the 
borders into neighboring countries. A significant contributor to the outbreak was the inability of urban 
water utilities to treat supplied water. 
A sign of the network quality deterioration can be seen in the extremely high distribution losses, 
which amount to almost half of the water produced. In fact between the early 2000s and mid-2000s, 
unaccounted for water increased by around 15 percent. 
Along with technical water supply problems, the quality of service has greatly deteriorated in recent 
year∫s. Access to wells and boreholes is the prevalent form of water supply covering about 50 percent of 
the population, significantly higher than for the peer group. But in 2004 around 75 percent of hand pumps 





from 34 percent in 1999 to 37 percent in 2005, conceals a major contraction in the use of stand posts, 
from 10 to 5 percent over the same period. In fact, 0.8 percent of the population per year lost access to 
standposts and around 0.3 percent of the population each year has been gaining access to wells and 
boreholes, a lower-quality form of water supply (figure 8a). 
Figure 8. While access to improved water supply has kept pace with population growth, sanitation levels lag 
(annualized growth) 
Population gaining access per year, 1999–05 
a. Water  b. Sanitation 
   
Source: WHO 2010, from the 1999 and 2005 Demographic and Health Surveys. 
 
Access to improved water is highly inequitable, with the poorest quintiles of the population not 
connected to piped water. Access to improved water in urban areas—where most of the better-off 
population lives—is 99 percent versus 67 percent in poorer rural areas (figure 9a), according to the 2005 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The main driver of the inequity is that piped-water service is 
more affordable in the more densely populated urban areas than it is in rural areas. The limited reach of 
piped water into rural areas makes the population largely reliant on springs and wells. Matters are made 
worse by the fact that more than two-thirds of these groundwater sources are unprotected, raising water-
quality risks. 
Zimbabwe‘s sanitation sector has deteriorated over time, causing an increase in reliance on open 
defecation and a sharp decline in access to improved latrines. Reliance on open defecation increased from 
27 to 29 percent between 1999 and 2005 (table 7), implying that, on average, 0.5 percent of the 
population was losing access to other forms of sanitation each year. Strikingly, access to flush toilets 
remained relatively steady, while access to improved latrines dropped from 25 to 14 percent between 
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The state of sanitation is particularly dire in the rural areas, where only 31 percent of individuals have 
access to improved sanitation (figure 9b). The difference is largely due to the ubiquity of flush toilets in 
urban areas (figure 9b). In rural areas, on the other hand, there has been a shift away from improved 
latrines and back toward inferior traditional latrines—and even open defecation in some cases. Indeed, up 
to 5 percent of rural Zimbabweans lost access to improved latrines between 1999 and 2008. This is due to 
the fact that the construction of the improved latrines was becoming obsolete, at a time when cement had 
become too scarce and expensive to allow for the necessary repairs and reconstruction of the latrine 
structures to take place. Despite the progress in traditional latrines and, to a much lower extent, flush 
toilets, the combined expansion of improved sanitation facilities fell short of rural population growth, 
which stood at 1.4 percent per year. 
Figure 9. Access to water sources is highly inequitable between urban and rural communities 
a. Water supply  b. Sanitation  
 
 
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: Access figures calculated by the AICD using data from the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey. 
 
Water utility performance is plagued by inefficiencies and lack of investment. In the late 1990s, 
legislation established the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) to take responsibility for water 
supply and sanitation nationwide. But water supply and sanitation systems significantly deteriorated 
under the ZINWA, affecting utility performance and service quality. The lack of investment in the sector 
for almost a decade has led the ZINWA to have distributional losses as high as 45 percent of production 
(see table 7), more than double the level of a well-performing utility and one of the highest among 
southern African utilities (figure 10a). Water production is estimated to be 30 percent below requirements 
(World Bank 2008a), while bill collection is very low at around 20 percent as of April 2009. Since 
dollarization in 2009, collections ratios started to pick up, but are still at very low levels. 
With less than 90 connections per employee, the ZINWA‘s labor productivity is one of the lowest in 






















































wastewater services from the ZINWA to local governments, and the capital city water services to Harare 
Water, is an important step to restore coverage and service quality to pre-ZINWA levels. 
 Figure 10. Distribution losses and labor productivity among southern African utilities 
Latest available year 
a. Distributional losses (percentage of production)  b. Labor productivity (connections per employee) 
   
Source: AICD water and sanitation utilities database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: Per water connection. Zimbabwe data is for 2008; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Another problem is that water tariffs do not cover costs. At an estimated $0.23 and $0.82 per m
3 for 
residential and nonresidential tariffs, respectively, the ZINWA‘s tariffs are below the tariffs reported in 
other water-scarce countries in Africa and other developing regions in the world (see table 7). 
About 60 percent of total water and sanitation sector spending needs comes from urban areas. This is 
due to the relatively rapid population growth in urban as opposed to rural areas (1.4 percentage points per 
annum versus 0.2 percentage points) and due to the prevalence of more costly higher-end water and 
sanitation solutions in urban areas (such as piped water and flush toilets). Water accounts for 87 percent 
of total needs, while sanitation accounts for the rest. Around 70 percent of sanitation needs are in the rural 
areas (table 8). 


































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8. Water and sanitation needs 
$ millions/year 
  Urban  Rural  Total 
Water and sanitation       
Total spending  260.0  167.4  427.5 
Capital spending  164.1  121.5  285.6 
   Expansion  67.3  47.4  114.7 
   Rehabilitation  96.8  74.1  170.9 
Operation and maintenance  95.9  45.9  141.8 
Water       
Total spending  242.9  128.3  371.2 
Capital spending  151.4  88.4  239.8 
   Expansion  57.5  23.0  80.5 
   Rehabilitation  93.8  65.4  159.2 
Operation and maintenance  91.5  39.9  131.4 
Sanitation       
Total spending  17.2  39.1  56.3 
Capital spending  12.8  33.1  45.9 
   Expansion  9.8  24.4  34.2 
   Rehabilitation  3.0  8.7  11.7 
Operation and maintenance  4.4  6.1  10.5 




Zimbabwe has a relatively dense national road network. Total road density is 100 km/1,000 square 
kilometers (km
2)—double the figure for neighboring Zambia and almost triple that of Mozambique—and 
the network spanned almost 44,000 km in 2008.
8 The classified network—roads under state jurisdiction—
totaled 18,253 km in 2010, according to the recent Zimbabwe Road Condition Survey, while there are an 
additional 5,000 km of urban roads, and around 39,000 km of unclassified roads. The rural-accessibility 
index in Zimbabwe, at 46 percent, is more than double the regional averages (table 9).  
Zimbabwe has strong road connections with the SADC. Zimbabwe is linked to its neighbor South 
Africa—the largest regional economy and home to the busiest port in Africa—and other countries such as 
Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, and Tanzania through the 
North–South Corridor, the most extensive corridor system in the region. In addition, the North–South 
                                                 
8 Alternative sources, including several World Bank project documents, mention a total of more than 88,000 km, 





Corridor serves as a link to other important corridors that branch off from it, such as the Trans-Kalahari, 
Beira, Lobito, Dar es Salaam, and Nacala corridors (Curtis 2009). Along the corridor, the core road artery 
runs 7,500 km from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Durban in South Africa, via Lusaka, Zambia, through 
the Chirundu border crossing and on to Harare, Zimbabwe, and then into South Africa at Beitbridge. But 
as a result of recent political unrest in Zimbabwe, an alternative route has opened up, bypassing 
Zimbabwe and going through Botswana instead. 
The road sector went through important institutional reforms in 2000–01. Before the reforms most of 
the financing for roads came from government appropriations out of the national budget. But in the early 
2000s dedicated road-user charges were created and assigned to the road fund, to be managed by the 
Zimbabwe National Road Administration (ZINARA). But maintenance and rehabilitation is constrained 
by insufficient funding, aggravating the extent of undermaintenance.  
Challenges 
While Zimbabwe boasts one of the most extensive road networks in the region, its condition has 
deteriorated rapidly over the past two decades. As of 2008 Zimbabwe has one of the lowest percentages 
of roads in good condition the region (figure 11). The roads in poor condition include key regional 
arteries, such as the corridor leading to the port of Beira in northern Mozambique, hindering the 
competitiveness of the port even though it is significantly closer to Zimbabwe than the port of Durban. 
The 2010 Zimbabwe Road Condition Survey paints an even more dismal picture of the current quality of 
classified roads (table 10). Only 34 percent of total classified roads are in fair or good condition and only 
14 percent in good condition. The quality of paved/sealed roads is somewhat better than that of gravel and 
earth roads; nevertheless, a daunting 50 percent of classified paved roads are in poor condition and 
require costly rehabilitation. Based on the results of this survey, the government estimates that $2.9 
billion would be needed to rehabilitate Zimbabwe‘s entire classified network. 
Figure 11. Benchmarking road conditions against regional peers 2006–08
 
Source: AICD road sector database on southern sub-saharan african countries (2008). 













Percentage main road network length





Table 9. Zimbabwe’s road indicators benchmarked against Africa’s low- and middle-income countries, as of 2008  











Classified road network density  km/1,000 km2 of land area  96  98  51  278 
Total road network density [a]  km/1000 km2 of land area  145  128  100  318 
GIS rural accessibility   % of rural population within 2 km of all-season 
road  32  20  46  31 
Main road network condition [b]  % in good or fair condition  55  68  63  86 
Rural road network condition 
[c] 
% in good or fair condition   56  61  54  65 
Classified paved road traffic   AADT  843  1,408  861  2,451 
Classified unpaved road traffic   AADT  55  54  19  107 
Primary network 
overengineering 
% of primary network paved with 300 AADT or 
less  47  15  16  18 
Perceived transport quality [d]  % firms identifying transport as major business 
constraint  32  27  n.a.  18 
Source: AICD Road Sector Database on 40 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
a. Total network includes the classified and estimates of unclassified and urban networks. 
b. Main network for most countries is defined as result of adding the primary and secondary networks. 
c. Rural network is generally defined as the tertiary network and does not include the unclassified roads 
d. Source: World Bank—IFC Enterprise Surveys on 32 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
AADT = average annual daily traffic; GIS = geographic information system. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
Table 10. Quality of classified roads in Zimbabwe, 2010 
   Paved/sealed  Gravel  Earth  Total 
   km  %  km  %  km  %  km  % 
Very good  705  7  39  0  6  1  750  4 
Good  1,512  15  298  4  90  12  1,900  10 
Fair  2,720  28  706  9  56  7  3,482  19 
Poor  4,857  50  6,670  86  612  80  12,141  66 
Total  9,793  100  7,713  100  764  100  18,273  100 
Source: 2010 Zimbabwe Road Condition Survey. 
Based on the physical configuration and condition of Zimbabwe‘s infrastructure network, it is 
possible to estimate the resources that would be needed to clear the current rehabilitation backlog and 
maintain the network in good condition. Comparing recent spending against these norms indicates that 
Zimbabwe has not succeeded in securing adequate resources for road-network preservation and 
maintenance (figure 12). There is a shortfall of about 50 percent between recent spending on road 
maintenance and rehabilitation and the requisite amounts. As the benchmarking shows, this situation is 





Figure 6. Zimbabwe’s spending is not sufficient to cover maintenance and rehabilitation needs 
 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008 
 
One reason Zimbabwe does not have adequate road maintenance funds is that its fuel levy is too low. 
Fuel levies stand at $0.011 per liter of diesel and $0.0124 per liter of gasoline, well below more typical 
levels of $0.05–$0.10 per liter found elsewhere in Africa. The ZINARA plans to increase the gasoline 
fuel levy to 4 cents per liter to boost cost recovery, but so far its implementation has not been feasible. In 
addition, toll gates have been added to allow for the application of additional road-user charges. 
Nevertheless, the ZINARA has been unable to raise sufficient road-user revenues to cover road-
maintenance requirements, in part because it lacks control over the revenue collection, transfer, and 
allocation mechanisms. Further efforts are therefore needed to provide a secure and adequate source of 
funding for road maintenance. 
Zimbabwe needs to function more effectively as a regional transit country to allow smoother passage 
of trade flows from neighboring countries and to benefit from the business opportunities that these 
represent. Although Zimbabwe is on the crossroads of Africa, occupying a strategic position on the 
North–South corridor, it nonetheless faces one of the highest export and import costs in the region (figure 
14). The administrative costs and delays associated with moving freight across its borders are significant 
and include lengthy documentation time and high customs clearance fees and terminal-handling charges. 
A Mozambican company entering Zimbabwe must pay a number of charges including an entry visa fee 
costing approximately $30 for a month, and a customs guarantee costing $120 per year (USITC 2009). 
These administrative charges add greatly to the costs of trade. As a result, Zimbabwe was ranked 168 
among 183 countries in 2010 and 2011 with regard to facilitation of cross-border trade.
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Figure 13. Zimbabwe’s fuel levy and public contribution fall short of the road network’s maintenance and rehabilitation 
needs  
 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008.  
Figure 14. Trading across borders is expensive in Zimbabwe 
a. Export costs  b. Import costs 
   
Source: World Bank’s ―Doing Business‖ Database 2010.  
Note: CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
By far the most problematic road border crossings in southern Africa are those at Beitbridge 
(Zimbabwe to South Africa) and Chirundu (Zambia into Zimbabwe). The combined four-day delay at this 
pair of crossings is much higher than at any other major crossings in Africa, meaning as much as 
50 percent of transport time between Durban and Lusaka is lost at the Zimbabwean border. There is 
therefore an urgent need to create one-stop border crossings at these locations, and to rehabilitate existing 
border-post infrastructure. The overall investment cost of improving the performance of border posts 
along the corridor is relatively modest, lying between $20 million and $30 million. But challenging 
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administrative and regulatory reforms are also needed. Reducing delays would significantly help improve 
utilization of Zimbabwe‘s trucking fleet and lower transport prices. 
Rail 
Achievements  
Zimbabwe has a functional railway network. The state-controlled National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) 
rail network has a single-track route length of 3,077 km, of which 2,759 km are operational. The 
Bulawayo Beitbridge Railway (BBR), a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project, consists of around 317 km 
and runs from Beitbridge on the border with South Africa to Heany Junction near Bulawayo. 
Zimbabwe has the highest rail-traffic density in the region aside from South Africa. As the table 
below shows, the NRZ has very high freight density at around 902,000 tonne-km/km (table 11), while 
most other southern African railways are serving substantially less. Passenger density is also 
comparatively high. 















































































































































































































Concessioned (1)/ state run (0)  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  1 
Freight density (1,000 tonne-km/km)  902  469  827  90  270  663  364  475  2,427  406 
Passenger density (1,000 passenger-km/km)  166  —  —  38  103  44  44  33  60  92 
Labor productivity (1,000 traffic units per 
employee)  390  580  722  131  710  281  —  484  3,308  502 
Locomotive productivity (million traffic units 
per locomotive)  8  30  41  3  25  13  —  25  33  25 
Carriage productivity (1,000 passenger-km per 
carriage)  —  4,046  2,391  1,176  3,333  750  —  —  —  3,286 
Wagon productivity (1,000 net tonne-km per 
wagon)  195  950  987  82  260  476  —  805  913  377 
Freight yield (US cents/tonne-km)  —  —  —  6  5  3  3  —  —  4 
Passenger yield (US cents/passenger-km)  —  —  —  1  0.9  0.5  1  —  —  1 
Source: Bullock 2009. Derived from AICD rail operator database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: * With 2.5 passenger-km equivalent to 1 traffic unit, 1 tonne-km equivalent to 1 traffic unit. 
— = Not available. 
 
Zimbabwe‘s railways are interconnected with other national networks along the North–South 
Corridor, allowing for through traffic across Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and South Africa. But while 
the rails are physically connected and of compatible gauge, there is a lack of reciprocal access rights 
between operators that would allow through train service due to the lack of arrangements for servicing 





to be exchanged at national borders, often leading to extensive delays due to shortages in traction 
capacity. 
Challenges 
The NRZ is not functioning effectively as part of the regional corridor. It has very poor operational 
performance, one of the worst in southern Africa. For example, as table 11 shows, labor productivity and 
wagon productivity are comparatively low. Over the past decade, the NRZ‘s technical, operational, and 
financial performance have been adversely affected by instabilities in the Zimbabwean economy, which, 
along with the NRZ‘s obligation as a public entity to provide certain uncompensated public-service 
obligations, has led to poor financial performance. Moreover, as a quasi-government organization, the 
NRZ cannot always respond to market dynamics. This has culminated in loss of network capacity leading 
to reduced traffic, reduced revenues, and reduced availability of funds for infrastructure maintenance and 
renewal. The dilapidated state of the infrastructure has resulted in some major accidents and derailments 
(World Bank 2008a). 
In neighboring Zambia, the operator RSZ practices discriminatory pricing for rail freight, which is 
distorting rail traffic flows along the entire North–South Corridor, including those experienced by the 
NRZ. Across much of Sub-Saharan Africa rail tariffs are close to $0.05 per tonne-km, on a par with or 
slightly below that of roads. But the unregulated rail-freight tariffs charged by the Zambian operator RSZ 
can stand at more than $2.00 per tonne-km, or 40 times the region‘s average. These tariffs reflect an abuse 
of monopoly power, motivated in part by vertical integration, with the same concessionaire operating the 
Zambianlow-income countrierail network and the Beitbridge border crossing from Zimbabwe into South 
Africa. The high level of these tariffs is having a distortionary effect on traffic flows and investment 
decisions along the entire corridor. For example, copper exports from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
are currently going by road to avoid these charges, whereas they would be more naturally suited to rail 
transportation via the NRZ network. Resolving this situation is far from straightforward, and would 
probably require a major renegotiation of the Zambian rail concession contract, combined with careful 
tariff regulation thereafter. 
Air transport 
Achievements 
Zimbabwe has experienced steady growth in air transport capacity since 2004. About half of the seats are 
provided by the national carrier Air Zimbabwe, and a further 30 percent by two leading South African 
carriers.  
Zimbabwe‘s record on air transport safety is relatively strong. Air Zimbabwe, the national flag carrier 
out of Harare, is in the International Air Transport Association (IATA) International Safety Audit (IOSA) 
registry, meaning it has passed IATA‘s operational-safety audit. In addition, the 2004 International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Safety Oversight Audit found Zimbabwe overall to be slightly above 
global averages for the implementation of safety regulation and practices; in a follow-up, the country had 
an implementation rating of around 86 percent, compared to the global average of no more than 68 





Air Zimbabwe maintains regular service between Harare and London. Carriers based in Zimbabwe are 
not currently allowed to fly aircraft into the United States, however. 
Table 12. Benchmarking air transport indicators for Zimbabwe and select other countries 
Country   Zimbabwe  Botswana  Zambia  Mozambique  Namibia  South Africa 
Traffic (2007)              
Domestic seats (seats per year)  237,835  241,696  437,658  1,144,644  84,162  31,767,537 
Seats for international travel within 
Africa (seats per year)  1,109,986  435,708  1,459,766  582,836  877,812  6,314,557 
Seats for intercontinental travel (seats 
per year)  182,585  n.a.  113,217  91,637  242,736  7,707,063 
Seats available per capita  0.118  0.357  0.168  0.087  0.574  0.954 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air 
transport market (%)  30.20  60.25  17.53  31.54  39.39  16.66 
Quality             
Percent of seat-km in newer aircraft   71.4  100.0  63.8  57.0  79.0  83.8 
Percent of seat-km in medium or 
smaller aircraft  42.7  0.0  50.6  42.5  28.3  32.8 
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA 
audit  33.3  0  0  100.0  100  33.3 
FAA/IASA audit status  Failed  No audit  No audit  No audit  No audit  Passed 
Source: Bofinger 2009Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: The Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. A HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; 
the lower the HHI, the more diluted the market power exerted by one company/agent. 
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; 
IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
Challenges  
The air transport sector is not immune from Zimbabwe‘s political and economic challenges. Air 
Zimbabwe is struggling financially, and anecdotal evidence of poor schedule reliability and service 
quality show an airline with many operational challenges. The economic difficulties faced by the airline 
are potentially affecting its ability to import spare parts for maintenance. 
Zimbabwe‘s overall spending needs for the transport sector are estimated at $218 million annually for a 
decade, which would restore the road network to good condition and make improvements to other 
transport modes. By far the largest component of transport spending needs is rehabilitation of the road 
network, which accounts for 87 percent of total transport needs (table 13). Moreover, as much as 
70 percent of total road sector spending needs are traceable to restoring the condition of the extensive 
rural network. 





Figure 15. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Zimbabwe 
a. Seats  b. City pairs 
   
Source: Bofinger 2009Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: As reported to international reservation systems. 
NA = North Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Table 13. Zimbabwe’s transport needs 
US$ million per year 







Total  107.6  16.8  0.0  65.6  190.0 
  Regional  8.4  0.0  0.0  6.3  14.7 
  National  4.9  4.9  0.0  5.3  15.2 
  Rural  90.7  0.0  0.0  43.1  133.8 
  Urban  3.6  11.9  0.0  10.9  26.4 
 Railways  0.0  13.8  0.0  8.1  21.9 
Airports  0.3  0.0  0.6  5.0  5.9 
Total  107.9  30.7  0.6  78.7  217.9 
Source: Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009. 























































Information and communication technologies 
Achievements 
Despite Zimbabwe‘s political and economic situation, it has maintained parity with Sub-Saharan African 
averages for many ICT indicators. Fixed telephone line penetration exceeded the Sub-Saharan average in 
2008 and Internet access penetration was about the same. Mobile penetration has lagged due to chronic 
network underinvestment as a result of the country‘s economic situation. But the market more than 
doubled in 2009, lifting mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants to 24, reducing the gap between 
Zimbabwe and the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (table 14).  
Table 14. Benchmarking ICT indicators 
  Unit 








2000  2005  2008  2008  2008 
GSM coverage  % population under signal  48  56  59  56  56 
International bandwidth   Bits/person   1  4  10  24  34 
Internet   Users/100 people   0.4  3.9  4.5  4.6  5.1 
Landline   Subscribers/100 people   2.2  2.8  2.7  4.6  1.5 
Mobile phone   Subscribers/100 people   2.7  5.9  9.6  28.5  33.3 
  Low-income 
group  Sub-Saharan Africa  Zimbabwe 
2008  2008  2009 
Price of monthly mobile basket  US dollars  10.0  11.8  10.8 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  US dollars  9.8  11.6  9.8 
Price of monthly fixed broadband   US dollars  102  100  200 
Price of a call to the United States per minute  US dollars  —  0.8 
*Regional: 0.19 
International 
Group 1: 0.27 
Group 2: 0.47 
Group 3: 1.10 
Price of an inter-Africa call per minute  US dollars  —  1.0 
Source: Adapted from Econet, POTRAZ, Tel-One, AICD, and World Bank ICT At-a-Glance. 
Note: * Country breakdown not available. 
— = Not available.  
Challenges  
Zimbabwe has made some institutional reforms such as the creation of the Postal and 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). The country has introduced 
competition in the mobile sector with three operators: Econet, Telecel, and Net-One. It is also moving 
toward a streamlined licensing system. Despite the reforms, the level of competition remains low. There 
is only one fixed-line operator and four Internet service providers (ISPs), and Econet dominates the 
mobile market. Fixed operator Tel-One and its mobile subsidiary Net-One are state owned.
10 Foreign 
investment is limited to Telecel, which is 60 percent owned by Orascom of Egypt. 
                                                 
10 The government is reportedly searching for a strategic partner. See: 





A major issue has been the country‘s rampant inflation causing frequent tariff changes to ICT pricing 
(POTRAZ 2009). The dollarization of the economy in 2009 brought this to an end by introducing stability 
to tariffs, which are now expressed in U.S. dollars. Zimbabwe‘s fixed-line and mobile retail pricing is 
similar to peer averages. Fixed broadband is expensive, almost twice as much as the Sub-Saharan 
average, which is already high by international standards. 
Internet-access penetration in Zimbabwe is average for the southern African region (figure 17). There 
are no comprehensive official data on the number of Internet users in Zimbabwe, though the Zimbabwe 
All Media and Products and Services Survey found that 22 percent of urban dwellers aged 15 years and 
older used the Internet in mid-2010 (Ndlela 2010). This amounts to some 645,000 people or 5.1 of the 
total population.
11 
International connectivity is a challenge for Zimbabwe due to its landlocked situation. Much of 
Zimbabwe‘s international connectivity has been through satellite. Activities are under way to build out 
national fiber networks to obtain cross-border connectivity to undersea fiber cable. For example, 
Powertel, a subsidiary of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, inked an agreement with the 
Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (BTC) for supply of international bandwidth via its links to 
undersea cables (Smarts 2010). Tel-One is building a fiber-optic cable to Mutare on Zimbabwe‘s eastern 
border where it will connect to a submarine cable in Mozambique (Technology Zimbabwe, June 24, 
2010). Econet is also busy laying a nationwide fiber-optic cable backbone with spurs planned for 
connection to undersea fiber systems in Mozambique and South Africa (Econet Wireless Zimbabwe 
2010). If these initiatives achieve fruition, they would create competing sources of international 
bandwidth, driving down bandwidth costs and retail broadband prices. Wireless broadband will also 
create greater competition with Econet having launched 3G and WiMAX
12 networks while Powertel and 
Tel-One have deployed CMDA
13 2000-based high-speed wireless networks. 
                                                 
11 As in most low-income countries, Internet access is estimated to be negligible in rural areas in Zimbabwe. The 
2010 estimate for Internet users is derived from applying the ZAMPS[[expand acronym?]] survey data to the urban 
population 15 years and older using statistics for Zimbabwe from the United Nations. See: 
unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/. 
12 Worldwide interoperability for microwave access. 





Figure 16. Around 13 percent of Zimbabwe’s population can be reached by GSM signal under a subsidy scheme 
 
Source: Mayer and others 2009. 
Existing access represents the percentage of the population covered by voice infrastructure as of the third quarter of 2006. 
Efficient market gap represents the percentage of the population for whom voice telecommunications services are commercially viable given 
efficient and competitive markets. 
Coverage gap represents the coverage gap—the percentage of the population for whom services are not viable without a subsidy. 
GSM = global system for mobile communications; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
Figure 17. Telecom coverage in Zimbabwe 
a. Voice infrastructure  b. Broadband 
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Source: Mayer and others 2009. 
























































































































































Figure 18. Zimbabwe’s Internet market and southern African peers  
a. Internet service trends, Zimbabwe, 2000–08   b. Internet service trends, southern Africa 
   
Source: AICD. 
Mobile is the best hope for extending connectivity to most Zimbabweans. Telecel reports its network 
has population coverage of 68 percent (Orascom Telecom 2009), while Econet states ―all urban areas and 
most rural areas have been covered (Econet Wireless Zimbabwe 2010)‖ The country is thus close to 
reaching its coverage gap, which has been calculated to be 13 percent (figures 16, 17) (AICD 2009). The 
coverage gap represents the proportion of the population living in areas that may not be commercially 
viable and require some level of public investment or subsidy. There is a universal service fund to which 
operators contribute 2 percent of their revenues, and which could be used to complete mobile coverage of 
the population. Consistent with that potential, annual private flows to the sector increased in 2008 and 
2009, from average commitments of $17 million in 1998–2007 to average commitments of $162 million 
in 2008–09.
14 
Financing Zimbabwe’s infrastructure 
To meet its most pressing infrastructure needs and catch up with developing countries in other parts of the 
world, Zimbabwe needs to expand its infrastructure assets in key areas (table 15). The targets outlined in 
table 15 are purely illustrative, but they represent a level of aspiration that is not unreasonable. Developed 
in a standardized way across African countries, they allow for cross-country comparisons of the 
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affordability of meeting the targets, which can be modified or delayed as needed to achieve financial 
balance. In the power sector, the targets assume that Zimbabwe will reach demand-supply balance based 
on its own domestic energy sources and meet national electrification targets of 52 percent. In terms of 
water, the targets assume that Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be met using the same mix of 
high- and low-end service types as is prevalent today. In transport, the target is to reach full connectivity 
of the capital city with international borders and secondary towns, as well as into agriculturally productive 
areas.  
Table 15. Illustrative ―ideal‖ investment targets for infrastructure in Zimbabwe 
  Economic target  Social target 
ICT  Install fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and 
submarine cable. 
Provide universal access to GSM signal and public 
broadband facilities. 
Irrigation  Develop additional 141,846 hectares of large-scale and 
1,742 hectares of economically viable small-scale irrigation. 
n.a. 
Power  Develop 2,251 MW of new generation capacity and 3,072 
MW of interconnector capacity (no-trade scenario).  
Rise electrification to 51.8 percent (98.8 percent urban and 
13.7 percent rural). 
Transport  Achieve regional (national) connectivity with good-quality 2-
lane (1-lane) paved road. 
Provide rural road access to 78.6 percent of the highest-
value agricultural land, and urban road access within 500 
meters. 
WSS  n.a.  Achieve Millennium Development Goals, clear sector 
rehabilitation backlog. 
Source: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others 2009. 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GSM = global system for mobile communications. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
Meeting these illustrative ―ideal‖ infrastructure targets for Zimbabwe would cost a staggering 
$2 billion per year over a decade. Capital expenditure would account for 60 percent of this requirement. 
Meeting the growing demand for power—the sector with by far the highest spending needs—will require 
an estimated $1.4 billion per year to install almost 2,251 MW of new generation capacity; 3,072 MW of 
interconnector capacity, and around $0.3 billion to rehabilitate the power network. Capital expenditure 
accounts for up to 67 percent of the total power needs. The water and sanitation sector is the area with the 
second highest spending needs: about $0.4 billion will be needed each year to meet the MDGs, with the 
capital investments absorbing close to 70 percent of the needs. As in the power sector, a significant 
amount is required for rehabilitation—around $0.2 billion per year. Another $0.2 billion per year will be 
required by the transport sector. While less than the amounts needed for other infrastructures sectors, 
requirements for ICT and irrigation are also high in absolute terms, amounting to around $0.08 billion and 
$0.05 billion a year respectively. 
Zimbabwe‘s infrastructure spending needs are comparatively high in absolute terms, and even more 
so in GDP terms—Zimbabwe‘s burden of needs at 45.7 percent of GDP
15 is among the highest in the 
region (figure 19). Investment would absorb around 40 percent of GDP, more than twice what China 
invested in its infrastructure during the mid-2000s.  
But given the volatility of Zimbabwe‘s GDP and, in the recent past, exchange rate, the estimate of the 
burden of needs relative to GDP is extremely sensitive to the year for which GDP is considered. For 
example, if expressed as percentage of average 1995–2000 GDP, the burden of needs would amount to 
                                                 





about 39 percent. Looking ahead, the relative burden is expected to decrease from the 2009 level to about 
30 percent in 2010, as the projected nominal 2010 GDP is expected to continue rebounding. Even then, 
the burden is comparatively very high.  
Thus, Zimbabwe‘s ―ideal‖ investment scenario may lie out of reach for the time being. Therefore, two 
alternative scenarios were developed in this case (table 16).  
Table 16. AICD annual spending needs estimates over a 10-year period 
$ million per year 
Scenarios 
Ideal  Intermediate  Minimalist 
Total  2,009  1,729  1,219 
Power  1,242  1,156  665 
WSS  427  342  313 
Transport  218  110  187 
ICT  75  75  36 
Irrigation  47  47  18 
New investment       
Power  577  491  0 
WSS  115  48  0 
Transport  31  16  0 
ICT  39  39  0 
Irrigation  29  29  0 
Rehabilitation       
Power  257  257  257 
WSS  171  171  171 
Transport  108  24  108 
ICT  0  0  0 
Irrigation  17  17  17 
Maintenance      0 
Power  408  408  408 
WSS  142  123  142 
Transport  79  69  79 
ICT  36  36  36 
Irrigation  1  1  1 
Source: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others, AICD 2009. Derived 
from models that are available online at www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models. 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
 
The ―minimalist‖ scenario assumes that only maintenance and rehabilitation needs should be met, 
thus reducing the total annual needs by 40 percent from $2.009 billion to $1.219 billion. But not making 
any new investments would have a negative impact on Zimbabwe‘s growth and economic sustainability 
and may slow down the overall recovery. Therefore, an ―intermediate‖ scenario is also considered, which, 
in addition to maintenance and rehabilitation needs, allows for a modest level of new investment, 





meeting the MDGs for water supply and sanitation with lower-cost technologies than previously used, 
such as stand posts, boreholes, and improved latrines, could reduce the associated price tag by $85 million 
annually. Similarly, meeting transport-connectivity standards using lower-cost road-surfacing 
technologies—such as the single-surface treatment—could reduce the associated price tag by $108 
million. Under this ―moderate‖ scenario, the total infrastructure spending needs are reduced by 14 percent 
from $2.009 billion to $1.729 billion per year. 
Figure 19. Zimbabwe’s infrastructure spending needs are among highest in the region relative to GDP 
Estimated infrastructure spending needed to meet targets, as percentage of GDP 
 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: LIC = low-income countries; MIC = middle-income countries; SADC = Southern African Development Community; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 
Zimbabwe already spends a sizable amount ($0.8 billion per year) to meet its infrastructure needs 
(table 17). Characteristically, for Zimbabwe, as much as 83 percent of the total is allocated to operations 
and maintenance (O&M) and only 17 percent to capital expenditures. The emphasis onlow-income 
countrieO&M spending underscores the fact that maintaining already-existing infrastructure stock is both 
a challenge and a priority for Zimbabwe. Operating expenditure is entirely covered from budgetary and 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) resources and payments by infrastructure users. Around 25 percent of 
capital-expenditure funding comes from public sources. Overall, the central government directly accounts 
for slightly more than 2 percent of the public spending, with the rest being channeled via parastastal 
entities. Non–Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Non-OECD) financiers 
account for an impressive 63 percent of total capital spending. The private sector accounts for another 10 
percent, and official development assistance (ODA) flows at around 1 percent also play a smaller, but 
nonetheless significant, role. 
Zimbabwe‘s existing infrastructure spending amounts to a staggering 23 percent of GDP (figure 20). 
This represents a very high level of effort, even when compared to the average for low-income states. 
Relative to its peer group, Zimbabwe, due to international sanctions, is much less reliant on ODA. 
Instead, its power sector capital investments are heavily reliant on non-OECD funding. Public 
investments on the other hand, are scarce in the power sector, but are more pronounced in the road and 
water sectors. The ICT sector, similar to the comparator group, is predominately financed by private 






















players. Zimbabwe‘s spending effort on power is substantially higher than the respective average for 
other low-income countries (figure 21). The largest share of infrastructure spending goes to power (48 
percent), followed by ICT (24 percent), transport (17 percent), and water and sanitation (11 percent) 
(table 17). 
Table 17. Financial flows to Zimbabwe’s infrastructure, 2009* 
$ millions per year 
 
O&M  Capital expenditure 
Total 
spending  Public sector 
Public 
sector  ODA 
Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI 
Total 
CAPEX 
Information and communication technology  175  0  1  0  14  15  190 
Irrigation  1  1  0  0  0  1  2 
Power   294  1  0  83  0  84  378 
Transport   110  23  0  1  0  24  134 
Water supply and sanitation  75  9  1  0  0  10  85 
Total  654  34  2  84  14  134  788 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official development assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; CAPEX = 
capital expenditure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
* in few singular cases, where 2009 numbers were not available, 2004 spending was used instead. 
Figure 20. Zimbabwe’s existing infrastructure spending is one of the highest in the region
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: LIC = low-income countries; MIC = middle-income countries; SADC = Southern African Development Community; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 





















Figure 21. Zimbabwe’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure differs from that of comparator countries 
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households. ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and 
sanitation; LIC = low-income countries. 
How much more can be done with existing resources? 
As much as $752 million of additional resources could be recovered each year by improving efficiency 
(table 18). The most vexing problem is the underrecovery of costs in power, roads, and water. Every year 
up to $321 million is lost due to undercharging in these three infrastructure sectors. Raising power tariffs 
to cost-recovery levels could save $220 million annually, a better-balanced road fuel levy could bring in 
an additional $71 million, and more economically reasonable water tariffs could recover additional $48 
million per year. Collection of bills also needs to be improved—as a result of poor collection discipline, 
Zimbabwe is losing $255 million per year in the power sector and $18 million per year in the water 
sector. Overstaffing in power and water parastastals is also quite significant. Cutting staff levels to 
economically viable benchmarks could save $71 million and $8 million in the power and water sectors, 
respectively; reducing distributional losses could save another $27 million and $10 million in the water 
and power sectors, respectively. Looking across sectors, the power and water sectors can benefit the most 
from tackling identified inefficiencies, followed by the roads sector. 
Table 18. Zimbabwe’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency (annualized) 
 
ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Underrecovery of costs  —  n.a.  220  71  48  339 
Overstaffing  n.a.  —  91  —  10  101 
Distribution losses  —  —  10  —  27  37 
Undercollection  —  n.a.  255  n.a.  18  273 
Low budget execution  0  0  0  1  1  2 
Total  0  0  576  72  104  752 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
— = Not applicable. 
n.a. = Not available. 
Undercharging for power alone costs Zimbabwe about $220 million each year. Even compared with 
the rest of Africa, where underpricing of power is commonplace, Zimbabwe‘s power company ZESA 




















has been $0.10 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) historically in Zimbabwe, while the average effective tariff stood 
at only $0.0753 as of 2009. The discrepancy produced an associated financial burden of about 5.0 percent 
of GDP (figure 22). 
In the water sector, as of 2009 the ZINWA‘s average tariffs stand at $0.30 per m
3, falling 
substantially short of the estimated cost-recovery tariff of $0.74 per m
3. The economic burden caused by 
this discrepancy, 1.1 percent of GDP, is lower than that for power, but nevertheless is huge. In 
comparison to the average for low-income, fragile countries, Zimbabwe performs considerably worse 
when it comes to cost recovery of water and power tariffs. 
Figure 22. Underpricing of power and water in Zimbabwe is burdensome 




Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; LIC = low-income countries. 
 
Moreover, because of inequitable access to power and water services in Zimbabwe, subsidized tariffs 
are regressive. More than 90 percent of those that have electricity or piped-water connections belong to 
the top 40 percent of the expenditure distribution; such connections are nonexistent for poorer households 
(figure 23). Only the richest quintile has access to piped water, while most of those in the poorest 
quintiles still rely on surface water. This inequitable distribution of connections virtually guarantees that 
any price subsidy to these services will be extremely regressive. 
Both the power utility ZESA and water utility ZINWA are comparatively inefficient in terms of bill 
collection. While ratios may fluctuate from year to year, the most recent data available suggest that ZESA 
manages to collect only 62 percent of its power bills, while the ZINWA collects only 45.7 percent. As a 
result, the power utility undercollects $225 million per year, and the water utility undercollects $18 
million per year. 
 
































Figure 23. Consumption of infrastructure services in Zimbabwe is highly differentiated by budget 
a. Mode of water supply, by income quintile  b. Prevalence of connection to power grid among Mozambican 
population, by income quintile 
   
Source: Banerjee and others 2009. 
Note: Q1—first budget quintile, Q2—second budget quintile, and so on. 
 
ZESA‘s distributional losses of 11 percent are not that far from the best-practice 10 percent 
benchmark for power, but they still result in $10 million in losses. Losses are more pronounced in the 
water sector, where nonrevenue water accounts for as much as 46.3 percent of total water production. 
This costs Zimbabwe about $27 million a year, equivalent to 0.61 percent of GDP. Zimbabwe could avoid 
this cost by increasing the bill collection efficiency and reducing losses for water and power services. 
Across both the power and water sectors, the burden of utility inefficiencies in Zimbabwe is considerably 
higher than for the benchmark countries (figure 24).  
Figure 24. Zimbabwe’s power and water utilities: The burden of inefficiency  
a. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the power sector, as 
a percentage of GDP 
b. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the water sector, as a 
percentage of GDP  
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 







































































































Annual funding gap 
Zimbabwe‘s infrastructure funding gap amounts to $584 million per year in the case of the idealistic 
scenario, or about 13 percent of GDP once efficiencies are captured. Every infrastructure sector except 
ICT is facing a funding gap (table 19). By far the biggest funding gap, even after accounting for 
significant efficiency potential, is found in the power sector, followed by water and sanitation. The 
funding gap could be fully funded from the available resources, assuming that huge efficiency gains are 
captured, under the minimalistic scenario set out above or the recent Governmental Action Program for 
Infrastructure. According to the action program, Zimbabwe would require $962 million of public and 
$460 million of private funds annually to meet most pressing infrastructure needs, including rehabilitation 
of existing stock and upgrades. 
Adopting lower-cost technologies could substantially reduce the cost of meeting the posited 
infrastructure targets, and eliminate the funding gap. The overall savings from these measures would 
amount to $226 million or 38 percent of the country‘s total infrastructure funding gap, underscoring the 
importance of technology choices. 
Table 19. Funding gaps by sector  
US$ millions 
  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Spending needs idealistic scenario  (75)  (47)  (1,242)  (218)  (427)  (2,009) 
Spending needs intermediate scenario  (75)  (47)  (1,156)  (110)  (342)  (1,729) 
Spending needs minimalist scenario  (36)  (18)  (665)  (187)  (313)  (1,219) 
Existing spending*  51   2   378   103   85   618  
Reallocation potential within sectors  24   0   0   31   0   55  
Efficiency gains  0   0   576   72  104   752  
             
Funding gap idealistic scenario  —  (44)  (288)  (13)  (239)  (584) 
Funding gap intermediate scenario  —  (45)  (202)  —  (153)  (304) 
Funding gap minimalistic scenario  —  (16)  —  —  (124)  - 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation of the funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that it would be 
applied toward other infrastructure sectors. 
WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
* traced to needs. 
— = Not available. 
What else can be done?  
The funding gap can be addressed only by raising additional financing or, alternatively, by adopting 
lower-cost technologies or less-ambitious development targets. Zimbabwe may have realistic prospects 
for increasing the flow of resources to infrastructure, and to power and water in particular, both from the 
public and private sectors, and from ODA. But due to its economic and political turmoil, Zimbabwe has 
not attracted as much private finance into infrastructure as other African peers. Over the early 2000s, 
Zimbabwe has captured private investment commitments worth only around 0.4 percent of GDP, 





Notable are the absence of private investments in the power sector (figure 25). Countries such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal have all captured between 
1.8 and 2.5 percent of GDP, while the most successful country in this regard, Guinea-Bissau, has captured 
in excess of 3.0 percent of GDP.  
Figure 25. Zimbabwe needs to attract more private investment 
 
Source: World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, 2010. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; ICT = information and communications technology. 
Attracting required private sector funding is a challenge. The uncertain and difficult investment 
climate in Zimbabwe, where private property itself seems frequently jeopardized, makes it difficult to 
attract investors. Furthermore, most of the infrastructure providers are parastastals that require 
restructuring before any private participation can take place; poor parastastal performance currently poses 
too high a risk for private investors, and the regulatory framework needs to be revised and properly 
implemented. However, the potential scope of private participation in infrastructure (PPI) in Zimbabwe is 
highly promising, and therefore the country must take all possible means to tap this potential. 
Given the size of the funding gap, clear principles for prioritization and sequencing of infrastructure 
investment decisions are essential. Since infrastructure is only a means to an end, it is important to define 
infrastructure development plans in close coordination with the national growth vision. Zimbabwe is 
currently envisaging a growth strategy based around key development corridors that anchor economic 
activities in a number of key sectors including agriculture, forestry, and mining. Scoping out the 
infrastructure packages needed to support development along these corridors would be a helpful way of 
prioritizing the overall national requirements identified in this report. 
In any case, it will likely be necessary for Zimbabwe to consider a period longer than a decade to 
reach the illustrative infrastructure targets here outlined. Under business-as-usual assumptions on 
spending and efficiency, it would take a very long time for Zimbabwe to reach these goals. But with a 
combination of increased finance, improved efficiency, and cost-reducing innovations, it should be 
possible to catch up in a much shorter period. Simulations suggest that even if Zimbabwe is unable to 
raise additional finance, if at least inefficiencies can be addressed, the identified infrastructure targets 
could be achieved within a 14-year horizon. But without stemming inefficiencies, the existing resource 




















This country report draws upon a wide range of papers, databases, models, and maps that were created as 
part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. All of these can be downloaded from the project 
Web site: www.infrastructureafrica.org. For papers go to the document page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/documents), for databases to the data page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), for models go to the models page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models), and for maps to the map page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/maps). The references for the papers that were used to compile 
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